Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Names(s). Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG
Goals and Objectives. Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the Philippines. Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago. Most claim, however, that since the late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial gain.
Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings.

Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Returning to the Philippines in 1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of Philippine Islamic radicalism, to continue the cause there. In 1998, Janjalani was killed in a shootout with police in Basilan. Since then, a single strong leader has not emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated commands led by the personal power of individual leaders. Khaddafi Janjalani, Abubakar’s brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.

In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions of Filipino Christians. In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom payments. In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.

In May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans (see below).

In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the ASG. In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President Arroyo and offered direct military assistance. In January 2002, the U.S. sent 650 troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under strict rules of engagement negotiated in June. Troop strength rose to around 1,300 at the height of operations.

The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include: increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population’s support for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects. The majority of U.S. forces withdrew by July 31, 2002.

Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings.

Anti-American Activities. In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of 20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. In June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero, had beheaded him. In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based on American intelligence. Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued. The three Americans were apparently held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from the Burnham family. The couple was not released after the payment was made.

Areas of Operation. ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there. In 2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.

Strength and Composition. The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim radicals. The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500 members. According to the Philippine government, the group’s strength reached 1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.

That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and military assistance from the United States to around 450. The group maintains its own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between island bases.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Links between ASG and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate. It is generally believed that the group received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf fighters. However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al Qaeda and ASG. Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda, but others contend that because of the group’s blatant use of ransom and extortion for profit, a close association between the two is unlikely. The 2002 edition of the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al Qaeda.

Though Janjalani’s first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF, deny having links with Abu Sayyaf. Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on civilians and its profiteering. The Philippine military, however, has claimed that elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains most of its financing through ransom and extortion. One report estimated its revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million. According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia. "Libya was a conduit for ransoms paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money for ‘livelihood projects’ in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf."

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism. Congressional oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important. Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs. If the latter, then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question. The issue of the ASG’s ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here. The role of Libya in providing ransom money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as amended)). Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and MNLF is ambiguous and controversial. Given the importance of the Philippines as an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching.